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Abstract
We describe some of the main features of the recent vintage macro-
economic models used for monetary policy evaluation. We point to
some of the key di⁄erences with respect to the earlier generation of
macro models, and highlight the insights for policy that these new
frameworks have to o⁄er. Our discussion emphasizes two key aspects
of the new models: the signi￿cant role of expectations of future policy
actions in the monetary transmission mechanism, and the importance
for the central bank of tracking the natural levels of output and the
real interest rate. We argue that both features have important impli-
cations for the conduct of monetary policy.
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for two related reasons. First, some of the existing models, like the Wharton
Econometric model and the Brookings Model, failed spectacularly to fore-
cast the stag￿ ation of the 1970s..Second, leading macroeconomists leveled
harsh criticisms of these frameworks. Lucas (1976), and Sargent (1981), for
example, argued that the absence of an optimization-based approach to the
development of the structural equations meant that the estimated model co-
e¢ cients were likely not invariant to shifts in policy regimes or other types
of structural changes. Similarly, Sims (1980) argued that the absence of
convincing identifying assumptions to sort out the vast simultaneity among
macroeconomic variables meant that one could have little con￿dence that the
parameter estimates would be stable across di⁄erent regimes. These power-
ful critiques made clear why econometric models ￿t largely on statistical
relationships from a previous era did not survive the structural changes of
1970s.
In the 1980s and 1990s, many central banks continued to use reduced
form statistical models to produce forecasts of the economy that presumed
no structural change, but they did so knowing that these models could not
be used with any degree of con￿dence to generate forecasts of the results of
policy changes. Thus, monetary policy-makers turned to a combination of
instinct, judgment, and raw hunches to assess the implications of di⁄erent
policy paths for the economy.
Within the last decade, however, quantitative macroeconomic frameworks
for monetary policy evaluation have made a comeback. What facilitated
the development of these frameworks were two independent literatures that
1emerged in response to the downfall of traditional macroeconomic modelling:
New Keynesian theory and real business cycle theory.1 The New Keynesian
paradigm arose in the 1980s as an attempt to provide microfoundations for
key Keynesian concepts such as the ine¢ ciency of aggregate ￿ uctuations,
nominal price stickiness, and the non-neutrality of money (e.g. Mankiw and
Romer (1991)). The models of this literature, however, were typically sta-
tic and designed mainly for qualitative as opposed to quantitative analysis.
By contrast, real business cycle theory, which was developing concurrently,
demonstrated how it was possible to build quantitative macroeconomic mod-
els exclusively from the ￿ bottom up￿ ￿that is, from explicit optimizing be-
havior at the individual level (e.g. Prescott (1986)) These models, however,
abstracted from monetary and ￿nancial factors and thus could not address
the issues that we just described. In this context, the new frameworks re￿ ect
a natural synthesis of the New Keynesian and real business cycle approaches.
Overall, the progress has been remarkable. A decade ago it would have
been unimaginable that a tightly structured macroeconometric model would
have much hope of capturing real world data, let alone of being of any use in
the monetary policy process. However, frameworks have been recently devel-
oped that forecast as well as the reduced form models of an earlier era (for
example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters
(2003, 2006)). Because these models have explicit theoretical foundations,
they can also be used for counterfactual policy experiments. A tell-tale sign
that these frameworks have crossed a critical threshold for credibility is their
widespread use at central banks across the globe. While these models are
1For references to NK theory see, Mankiw and Romer (1991). For references to RBC
theory, see Prescott (1986).
2nowhere close to removing the informal dimension of the monetary policy
process, they are injecting an increased discipline to thinking and communi-
cation about monetary policy.
To be sure, there were some important developments in between the tra-
ditional macroeconometric models and the most recent vintage. Frameworks
such as Taylor (1979) and Fuhrer and Moore (1995) incorporated several im-
portant features that were missing from the earlier vintage of models: (i) the
Phelps/Friedman natural rate hypothesis of no long-run tradeo⁄between in-
￿ ation and unemployment, and (ii) rational formation of expectations. At the
same time, however, the structural relations of these models typically did not
evolve from individual optimization. The net e⁄ect was to make these frame-
works susceptible to some of the same criticisms that led to the demise of the
earlier generation of models (see, e.g. Sargent, 1981). It is also relevant that
over the last twenty years there have been signi￿cant advances in dynamic
optimization and dynamic general equilibrium theory. To communicate with
the profession at large, particularly the younger generations of scholars, it
was perhaps ultimately necessary to develop applied macroeconomic models
using the same tools and techniques that have become standard in modern
economic analysis.
Overall, our goal in this paper is to describe the main elements of this
new vintage of macroeconomic models. Among other things, we describe the
key di⁄erences with respect to the earlier generation of macro models. In
doing so, we highlight the insights for policy that these new frameworks have
to o⁄er. In particular, we will emphasize two key implications of these new
frameworks.
31. Monetary transmission depends critically on private sector expecta-
tions of the future path of the central bank￿ s policy instrument, the short
term interest rate. Ever since the rational expectations revolution, it has
been well understood that the e⁄ects of monetary policy depend on private
sector expectations. This early literature, however, typically studied how ex-
pectations formation in￿ uenced the e⁄ect of a contemporaneous shift in the
money supply on real versus nominal variables.2 In this regard, the new liter-
ature di⁄ers in two important ways. First, as we discuss below, it recognizes
that central banks typically employ a short term interest rate as the policy
instrument. Second, within the model, expectations of the future perfor-
mance of the economy enter the structural equations, since these aggregate
relations are built on forward looking decisions by individual households and
￿rms. As a consequence, the current values of aggregate output and in￿ a-
tion depend not only on the central bank￿ s current choice of the short term
interest rate, but also on the anticipated future path of this instrument. The
practical implication is that how well the central bank is able to manage
private sector expectations about its future policy settings has important
consequences for its overall e⁄ectiveness. Put di⁄erently, in these paradigms
the policy process is as much, if not more, about communicating the future
intentions of policy in a transparent way, as it is about choosing the current
policy instrument. In this respect, these models provide a clear rationale for
the movement toward greater transparency in intentions that central banks
around the globe appear to be pursuing.
2. The natural (￿exible price equilibrium) values of both output and the
2See. e.g. Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1980)
4real interest rate provide important reference points for monetary policy￿ and
may ￿uctuate considerably. While nominal rigidities are introduced in these
new models in a more rigorous manner than was done previously, it remains
true that one can de￿ne natural values for output and the real interest rate
that would arise in equilibrium if these frictions were absent. These nat-
ural values provide important benchmarks, in part because they re￿ ect the
(constrained) e¢ cient level of economic activity and also in part because
monetary policy cannot create persistent departures from the natural values
without inducing either in￿ ationary or de￿ ationary pressures. Within tra-
ditional frameworks, the natural levels of output and the real interest are
typically modeled as smoothed trends. Within the new frameworks they
are modelled explicitly. Indeed, roughly speaking, they correspond to the
values of output and the real interest rate that a frictionless real business
cycle model would generate, given the assumed preferences and technology.
As real business cycle theory suggests, further, these natural levels can vary
considerably, given that the economy is continually bu⁄eted by "real" shocks
including oil price shocks, shifts in the pace of technological change, tax
changes, and so on. Thus, these new models identify tracking the natural
equilibrium of the economy, which is not directly observable, as an important
challenge for central banks.
In the next section, we lay out a canonical baseline model that captures
the key features of the new macro models and we draw out the correspond-
ing insights for monetary policy. We then discuss some of the policy issues
brought by the new models. We conclude by discussing some modi￿cations
of the baseline model that are necessary to take it to data, as well as other
5extensions designed to improve its realism.
1 A Baseline Model
In this section we lay out a baseline framework that captures the key features
of the new vintage macro models and is useful for qualitative analysis. The
speci￿c framework we develop is a variant of the canonical model discussed
in Goodfriend and King (1997), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Woodford
(2003), and Gal￿ (2007), among others, but modi￿ed to allow for investment.3
As with the real business cycle paradigm, the starting point is a stochas-
tic dynamic general equilibrium model. More speci￿cally, it is a stochastic
version of the conventional neoclassical growth model, modi￿ed to allow for
variable labor supply.4 As we suggested above, in order to make the frame-
work suitable for monetary policy analysis, it is necessary not only to intro-
duce nominal variables explicitly, but also some form of nominal stickiness.
In this regard, three key ingredients that are the prominent features of the
New Keynesian paradigm are added to the frictionless real business cycle
model: money, monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities. We brie￿ y
discuss each in turn:
The key role of money emphasized in the new monetary models is its
3We have avoided a label for the new frameworks because a variety have been used.
Goodfriend and King employ the term "New Neoclassical Synthesis," while Woodford
uses "NeoWicksellian." At the insistence of a referee, Clarida, Gali and Gertler used "New
Keynesian." The latter term has probably become the most popular, though it does not
adequately re￿ ect the in￿ uence of real business cycle theory.
4We note that the real business cycle model treats shocks to total factor productivity as
the main driving force of business cycles. By contrast, estimated versions of the new mon-
etary models suggest that intertemportal disturbances (i.e., shocks to either consumption
or investment spending) are key. See, e.g. Gal￿ and Rabanal (2005), Smets and Wouters
(2006) or Primiceri, Schaumberg and Tambalotti (2006).
6function as a unit of account, i.e. as the unit in which the prices of goods
and assets are quoted. The existence of money thus gives rise to nominal
prices. It is important, however, to distinguish between money and monetary
policy: Monetary policy a⁄ects real activity in the short run purely through
its impact on market interest rates. In particular, the central bank a⁄ects
aggregate spending by controlling the short term interest rate and, through
market expectations of its future short rate decisions, by in￿ uencing the full
yield curve. To control the short term interest rate, the central bank adjusts
the money supply to accommodate the demand for money at the desired
interest rate. These movements in the money supply, however, exert no
independent e⁄ect on aggregate demand. Because real money balances are a
negligible component of total wealth, the models are designed in a way that
abstracts from wealth e⁄ects of money on spending. Thus, while monetary
policy is central in these models, money per se plays no role other than to
provide a unit of account.
In order to introduce price stickiness in a rigorous way, it is necessary
that ￿rms be price-setters as opposed to price-takers. For this reason, it
is necessary to introduce some form of imperfect competition, where ￿rms
face downward sloping demand curves and, thus, a meaningful price-setting
decision. A version of the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic compe-
tition in which each ￿rm produces a di⁄erentiated good and sets the price for
the latter while taking as given all aggregate variables provides a simple way
to accomplish this and has generally been adopted by the new frameworks.
As with traditional models, what ultimately permits monetary policy
to have leverage over the real economy in the short run is the existence
7of temporary nominal rigidities. Because nominal prices adjust sluggishly,
by directly manipulating nominal interest rates, the central bank is able
to in￿ uence real rates and hence real spending decisions, at least in the
short run. The traditional models introduce sluggish price adjustment by
postulating a ￿Phillips curve￿relating in￿ ation to some measure of excess
demand, as well as lags of past in￿ ation. By contrast, these new vintage
models derive an in￿ ation equation￿ often referred to as the New Keynesian
Phillips curve￿ explicitly from individual ￿rms￿price setting behavior, as we
describe below.
We now turn to a description of our canonical framework. As with the tra-
ditional framework, it is convenient to organize the system into three blocks:
aggregate demand, aggregate supply, and policy. Further, it is possible to
represent each sub-sector by a single equation. In an appendix available with
the online version of this paper (at http://www.e-jep.org), we build up the
aggregate demand and aggregate supply relationships in detail. In what fol-
lows, we present the condensed aggregate demand and supply equations along
with an informal motivation. By adding an additional relation that describes
monetary policy, it is then possible to express the model as a simple three
equation system, similar in spirit to the way traditional models have been
represented. The main di⁄erence with the traditional framework, of course,
is that the new vintage of models are built on explicit micro foundations.
81.1 Aggregate Demand/Supply: A Compact Repre-
sentation
In developing this baseline model, it is useful to keep in mind that what
monetary policy can in￿ uence is the deviation of economic activity from its
natural level. Within our baseline model, the natural level of economic ac-
tivity is de￿ned as the equilibrium that would arise if prices were perfectly
￿ exible and all other cyclical distortions were absent. In the limiting case of
perfect price ￿ exibility, accordingly, the framework takes on the properties of
an real business cycle model. One di⁄erence with the latter is that because
there is monopolistic competition as opposed to perfect competition, the nat-
ural level of economic activity is below the socially e¢ cient level. However,
this distinction does not a⁄ect the nature of the associated cyclical dynamics
of the natural level of economic activity which, within our baseline frame-
work, resemble those of an real business cycle model with similar preferences
and technology.
Aggregate Demand. The aggregate demand relation is built up from
the spending decisions of a representative household and a representative
￿rm. In the baseline model, both capital and insurance markets are perfect.
Within this frictionless setting, the household satis￿es exactly its optimiz-
ing condition for consumption/saving decisions. It thus adjusts its expected
consumption growth positively to movements in the expected real interest
rate. Similarly, with perfect capital markets, the representative ￿rm satis￿es
exactly its optimizing condition for investment: it varies investment propor-
tionately with Tobin￿ s q, the ratio of the shadow value of installed capital to
the replacement value.
9From the individual spending decisions, it is possible to derive an IS
curve-type equation that relates aggregate demand inversely to the short
term interest rate, similar in spirit to that arising in a traditional framework.
In contrast to the traditional model, however, expectations of the future value
of the short term rate matter as well. They do so by in￿ uencing long term
interest rates and asset prices.
In particular, let e yt be the percentage gap between real output and its
natural level, let e rr
l
t be the gap between the long term real interest rate and
its natural level, and let e qt be the corresponding percentage gap in Tobin￿ s q5:
Then by taking log-linear approximations of both the baseline model and the
￿ exible price variant, it is possible to derive an aggregate demand equation
that relates the output gap, e yt; inversely to the real interest rate gap , e rr
l
t,
and positively to the gap in Tobin￿ s q, e qt, as follows:
e yt = ￿￿c￿ e rr
l
t + ￿i￿ e qt (1)
where ￿c and ￿i are the shares of consumption and investment, respectively,
in steady state output, ￿ is the intertermporal elasticity of substitution, and
￿ is the elasticity of the investment/capital ratio with respect to Tobin￿ s q.
In e⁄ect, this equation relates the output gap to the sum of two terms. The
￿rst corresponds to the consumption gap and the second to the investment
gap.
In particular, the consumption gap moves inversely with the long term
real interest rate gap e rr
l
t . Intuitively, if the long term real rate is above its
5To be clear, we de￿ne the natural level of economic activity in any given period period
t, conditional on the beginning of period capital stock. Monetary policy has no e⁄ect on
the natural level of economic activity as we have de￿ned. Monetary policy can a⁄ect the
path of the capital stock, though these e⁄ects are typically small in percentage terms under
reasonable parameterizations of the model.
10natural value, households will be induced to save more than in the natural
equilibrium and, hence, consumption will be lower. Similarly, if q is above
its natural value, ￿rms will be induced to invest more than they would under
￿ exible prices.
In order to link aggregate demand to monetary policy, it is useful to de￿ne
the short term real interest rate gap, e rrt, as the di⁄erence between the short
term real rate and its natural equilibrium value, rrn
t , that is
e rrt ￿ (rt ￿ Et￿t+1) ￿ rr
n
t
where rt is the short term nominal interest rate and ￿t+1 is the rate of in￿ ation
from t to t + 1. We note next:
(i) e rr
l
t depends positively on current and expected future values of e rrt:
(ii) e qt depends inversely on current and expected future values of e rrt:
Proposition (i) emerges from the link between long term interest rates and
current and expected short term interest rates implied by the expectation
hypothesis of the term structure Proposition (ii) arises Tobin￿ s q depends
on the discounted returns to capital investment, where the discount rates
depend on the expected path of short term real interest rates.
Thus the mechanism through which monetary policy in￿ uences aggregate
demand works can be thought of as working as follows. Given the sluggish
adjustment of prices, by varying the short term nominal rate the central
bank is able to in￿ uence the short-term real interest rate and, hence, the
corresponding real interest rate gap. Thus, through its current and expected
future policy settings it is able to a⁄ect the corresponding path of e rrt and,
in turn, in￿ uence the long term real rate gap, e rr
l
t , and the gap in Tobin￿ s
q, e qt.
11As in the traditional models, the framework can incorporate exogenous
￿ uctuations in government purchases or other aggregate demand compo-
nents. These ￿ uctuations in￿ uence both the natural level of output and
the natural real interest rate. However, the form of the aggregate demand
equation is not a⁄ected, since this relation is expressed in terms of gap vari-
ables.
Finally, we note that the compact form of the aggregate demand curve
depends on the assumption of perfect capital markets, so that both the per-
manent income hypothesis for consumption and the q theory for investment
are valid. As we discuss later, recent work relaxes the assumption of perfect
capital markets.
Aggregate Supply: The aggregate supply relation evolves from the
price setting decisions of individual ￿rms. To capture nominal price inertia,
it is assumed that ￿rms set prices on a staggered basis: each period a subset
of ￿rms set their respective prices for multiple periods. Under the most
common formulation, due to Calvo (1983), each period a ￿rm adjust its price
with a ￿xed probability that is independent of history.6 This assumption is
not an unreasonable approximation of the evidence (Nakamura and Steinsson
(2007) and Alvarez (2007)).
Under ￿ exible prices, during each period ￿rms set price equal to a constant
markup over nominal marginal cost. With staggered price setting, ￿rms that
are able to adjust in a given period set price equal to a weighted average
6The idea of using staggering to introduce nominal inertia is due to Fischer (1997)
and Taylor (1980), who used it to describe nominal wage setting. A virtue of the Calvo
formulation is that is facilitates aggregation. Because the adjustment probability is inde-
pendent of how long a ￿rm has kept its price ￿xed, it is not necessary to keep track of
when di⁄erent cohorts of ￿rms adjusted their prices.
12of the current and expected future nominal marginal costs. The weight on
a given future nominal marginal cost depends on the likelihood that the
￿rm￿ s price will have remained ￿xed until that particular period, as well as
on the ￿rm￿ s discount factor. The ￿rms that do not adjust prices in the
current period simply adjust output to meet demand, given that the price
is not below marginal cost. Thus, the nominal price rigidities permit output
to ￿ uctuate about its natural level. Given that ￿rms￿supply curves slope
upwards, further, these demand induced ￿ uctuations lead to countercyclical
markup behavior.
By combining the log-linear versions of the optimal price setting decision,
the price index and the labor market equilibrium, one can obtain the following
structural aggregate supply relation:
￿t = ￿ Et￿t+1 + ￿ e yt + ut (2)
where, following Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), ut is interpretable as a
"cost push shock." The equation has the ￿ avor of a traditional Phillips curve
in the sense that it relates in￿ ation ￿t to excess demand as measured by e yt
and also a term that re￿ ects in￿ ation expectations, in this case ￿ Et￿t+1:
In sharp contrast to the traditional Phillips curve, however, the opti-
mization based-approach here places tight structure on the relation. The
coe¢ cient on expected in￿ ation, ￿; is the household￿ s subjective discount
factor. The slope coe¢ cient on excess demand ￿, in turn, is a function of
two sets of model primitives. The ￿rst set re￿ ects the elasticity of marginal
cost with respect to output. The less sensitive is marginal cost to output
(i.e., the ￿ atter are supply curves), the less sensitive will price adjustment
be to movements in output (i.e., the smaller will be ￿). The second set
13re￿ ects the sensitivity of price adjustment to movements in marginal costs.
This includes the parameter that governs the frequency of price adjustment.
The lower this frequency, the fewer the ￿rms adjusting in any period, and
hence the less sensitive in￿ ation will be to marginal cost and the smaller
will be ￿.. Also potentially relevant are pricing complementarities that may
induce ￿rms to minimize the variation in their relative prices. These pricing
complementarities, know in the literature as ￿real rigidities,￿induce ￿rms
that are adjusting prices to want to keep their relative price close to the
non-adjusters. The net e⁄ect of real rigidities is to reduce ￿ and thus re-
duce the overall sensitivity of in￿ ation to output (Ball and Romer (1990)
and Woodford (2003)).7
In addition, the cost push shock, ut; has a strict theoretical interpreta-
tion. In the absence of market frictions other than nominal price rigidities
ut e⁄ectively disappears, making e yt the exclusive driving force for in￿ ation.
Key to this result is that ￿rms are adjusting price in response to expected
movements in marginal cost. In this benchmark case, deviations of real
marginal cost from its natural value are approximately proportionate to e yt;
e⁄ectively making the latter a su¢ cient statistic for the former. Roughly
speaking, movements in output above the natural level raise labor demand,
inducing an increase in wages and and a reduction in the marginal product of
labor, both of which tend to raise ￿rms￿marginal costs. With other types of
market frictions present, however, variation in ￿rms￿marginal costs need no
longer be simply proportional to excess demand. Suppose, for example, due
7Most of the empirical evidence points to low values for ￿ (Gali and Gertler (1999)).
However, with real rigidities present it is possible to reconcile the low estimates with the
microeconomic evidence on the frequency of price adjustment, as recently summarized in
Steinsson and Nakumura (2007), among others.
14to some form of labor market power, real wages rise above their competitive
equilibrium values. Holding constant e yt ￿rms￿marginal costs increase due to
the wage increase, thus fueling in￿ ation. In this instance, the cost push term
captures the impact on in￿ ation. More generally, ut encapsulates variation
in real marginal costs that is due to factors other than excess demand. In
the formulation here we will simply treat ut as exogenous. As we discuss
in section 4 and the appendix, however, more general formulations of this
model introduce endogenous variation in ut typically by allowing for wage
rigidity, introduced much in the same manner as price rigidity (via staggered
nominal wage setting.) Indeed, with wage rigidity present, ut, will depend
on conventional real shocks such as oil shocks and productivity shocks.
Another important way that the new Phillips curve di⁄ers from the old
is that it is fully forward looking. In￿ ation depends not only on the current
values of e yt and ut, but also on the expected discounted sequence of their
respective future values. This forward-looking property of in￿ ation implies
that a central bank￿ s success in containing in￿ ation depends not only on
its current policy stance, but also on what the private sector perceives that
stance will be in the future. We elaborate on this in the next section.
In the meantime, we note that this forward looking process for in￿ ation
contrast sharply with the traditional Phillips curve, which typically relates
in￿ ation to lagged values as well as some measure of excess demand, without
any explicit theoretical motivation. In the baseline version of the new Phillips
curve, arbitrary lags of in￿ ation do not appear.8
8Gali and Gertler (1999) and Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2005) estimate a hybrid
version of the new Phillips curve where in￿ ation depends on both lagged and expected
future in￿ ation. Lagged in￿ ation enters because a fraction of ￿rms set prices using
a backward-looking rule of thumb. The estimates suggest a weight of roughly :65 on
15The debate over the exact speci￿cation of the Phillips curve, of course,
has important consequences for the kind of constraints that a central bank
faces for its policy choices. The traditional Phillips curve implies that the
central bank faces a short run trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation and real activity:
Since expectations play no role in in￿ ation dynamics, the only way to reduce
in￿ ation in the short run is to contract economic activity. In contrast, with
the new Phillips curve expectations play a critical role and, as a result, the
short run trade-o⁄emerges in a more subtle way. In particular, absent move-
ments in the cost push term ut, there is no short run trade-o⁄, so long as the
central bank can credibly commit to stabilizing both current and expected
future in￿ ation. To see this, note that when no cost push term exists in￿ a-
tion depends only on the current and expected future values of the output
gap. Then in this instance, a central bank can maintain price stability by
adjusting short term interest rates in order to stabilize the output gap. It
can do so by setting the current nominal interest rate equal to the natural
real rate and by committing to stick to this policy in the future. Of course,
this presumes both that the central bank can perfectly identify the natural
real rate of interest and also that it can credibly commit to a path for the
future nominal rate. We return to this issue in the next section..
Even with perfect information and perfect credibility, a short run trade-
o⁄between the output gap and in￿ ation can emerge if cost push pressures are
present. In this instance, in￿ ation depends on current and expected move-
ments in ut as well as e yt. The only way to o⁄set this cost push pressure on
expected future in￿ ation and :35 on lagged in￿ ation for the U.S.. Thus, while lagged
in￿ ation appears a factor in in￿ ation dynamics, forward looking behavior is dominant.
Cogley and Sbordone (2006), further, present evidence to suggest that once one allows for
shifting trend in￿ ation, lagged in￿ ation disappears.
16in￿ ation is for the central bank to contract economic activity. We empha-
size that this basic insight on how cost pressures may introduce a short run
trade-o⁄ carries over to a setting where these pressure are endogenous due
to nominal wage rigidity.(Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000)).
Finally, the forward looking Phillips curve can give rise to a potential
credibility problem distinct from the one originally emphasized by Kydland
and Prescott (1977) or Barro and Gordon (1981). This earlier literature
stressed the temptation of central banks to unexpectedly push output above
the natural level. For central banks unable to make a credible commitment
to keeping in￿ ation low, the resulting outcome would be an ine¢ ciently high
level of in￿ ation. This potentially credibility problem, known as ￿in￿ ation
bias", is also explicitly present in the new vintage models since within these
frameworks the natural level of output is in general below the socially e¢ cient
level, due to the presence of imperfect competition. However, the forward
looking nature of in￿ ation within these new frameworks suggests another
potential pitfall of discretion, know in the literature as ￿stabilization bias"
(Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003)). In response to
expected cost pressures, a central bank would like to claim it will be tough
in the future, and will contract output as necessary, in order to ￿ght current
in￿ ation without having to contract output below its natural level today.
If the central bank could make this claim credible, it could reduce current
in￿ ation without reducing current output, due to the expectations e⁄ect.
The problem is that in the absence of a well established reputation (or some
other way of "tying its hands"), the central bank￿ s claim is not likely to be
credible: The private sector will recognize that once the next period arrives,
17the central bank will be tempted to delay again contracting the economy
(that is,. the initial plans are time-inconsistent).
Thus, the extent to which the central bank is credible regarding its future
policies will a⁄ect the short-run tradeo⁄ between in￿ ation and output gap
stabilization. Given the twin problems of in￿ ation and stabilization bias,
the new frameworks explicitly suggest a need for central banks to establish
credibility in monetary policy management,
The representation of this aggregate supply/aggregate demand framework
can be reduced to a system of di⁄erence equations describing the evolution
of the output gap and in￿ ation as a function of two exogenous variables (the
natural rate of interest and the cost push shock), as well as the path of the
nominal short term rate rt. The latter is determined, directly or indirectly,
by the decisions of the central bank. Thus, to close the model, we need to
provide a description of the way monetary is conducted.
1.2 Monetary Policy
Each period the central bank chooses a target for the short term interest rate,
as a function of economic conditions. To attain that rate, the central bank
adjusts the money supply to meet the quantity on money demanded at the
target interest rate. Why not simply do the reverse: set the nominal money
stock and let the interest rate adjust? One reason is the potential instability
of money demand suggested by the evidence. Under monetary targeting, this
instability would translate into interest rate volatility that could harm the
real economy.9
9It is important to recognize, however, that the quantity theory of money still holds
in the steady state, even with the interest rate as the policy instrument and a purely
18A simple interest rate feedback rule that has desirable stabilizing prop-
erties and also some empirical appeal as a description of what central banks





t + ￿￿ ￿t + ￿y e yt (3)
where ￿￿ > 1; ￿y ￿ 0 and where r￿
t is the central bank￿ s target for the short-
term nominal interest rate. With zero in￿ ation and no excess demand, the
rule has the central bank adjust the nominal rate to track movements in the
natural real rate, rrn
t .
Note that the rule implies that with in￿ ation and the output gap at zero,
the central bank keeps the current and expected future real interest rate
gaps at zero. On the other hand, if the economy is ￿overheating" with a
positive output gap and positive in￿ ation, the rule has the central bank raise
nominal rates. The feedback coe¢ cient on in￿ ation exceeds unity, implying
that nominal rates go up more than one for one with in￿ ation. This ensures
that the central bank raises real rates su¢ ciently to contract demand (by
inducing a positive sequence of real interest rate gaps.) Conversely, as the
economy weakens and in￿ ation declines, the rule has the central bank ease
su¢ ciently to provide demand stimulus.
This interest rate rule is often referred to as a ￿Taylor" rule. The reason
is that after a period of considerable focus on money growth rules in the
passive role for money demand (see, e.g., Woodford, 2006). Under standard speci￿cations
of money demand, the ratio of real money balances to output is constant in a steady state
with constant in￿ ation. Since this ratio is constant, within the steady state there is a
proportionate relation between the growth rate of the money stock and in￿ ation, as the
quantity theory suggests, and independently of whether the central bank has a monetary
target or not. Outside the steady state, however, the simple aggregate demand and supply
described earlier characterizes output and in￿ ation dynamics conditional on the expected
path of interest rates.
19academic literature, Taylor (1993, 1999) argued that an interest rate rule of
this type has desirable stabilizing properties and avoids the pitfalls of money-
based rules that some central banks had adopted in the previous decades.
Taylor also showed that a version of this rule with a constant natural real
interest rate and detrended output as the measure of the output gap does
a good job of describing actual monetary policy in the late 1980s. The
values of the feedback coe¢ cients in the rule plotted against the data were
￿￿ = 1:5 and ￿y = 0:5. The key feature that Taylor emphasized was that
￿￿ safely exceeded unity, thus ensuring that the policy induces real rates
to move to o⁄set in￿ ationary pressures. This feature has been dubbed the
￿Taylor principle",(by Woodford (2001)). A number of authors, including
Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (1998, 2000), have argued that during the late 1960s
and 1970s, the major central banks may have failed to abide by the Taylor
principle, thus contributing to both the high nominal and real instability over
this period.
For the very short sample period Taylor examined in his original paper,
it may be reasonable to treat the natural rate of interest as constant and
presume the natural level of output is captured by a smooth trend. But over
a longer sample it would be unwise for a central bank to do this. In addition,
the simple rule that Taylor studied does not capture central banks￿tendency
to smooth interest rates. A rule that comes closer to capturing the data has
the central banks move interest rates toward the target rate r￿
t , using the
following partial adjustment rule:
rt = (1 ￿ ￿) r
￿
t + ￿ rt￿1 (4)
where ￿ is a smoothing parameter which is usually estimated to be between
200:6 and 0:9 using quarterly data.
2 Using the Model for Monetary Policy Eval-
uation
In this section we show how the model may be used to evaluate di⁄erent
scenarios for the course of monetary policy. In the process, we illustrate the
two major implications that the new vintage models have for policy-making
that we emphasized in the introduction: (i) the importance of managing
expectations of future policy; and (ii) the need to track movements in the
economy￿ s natural equilibrium.
To evaluate di⁄erent policy strategies, of course, one has to have in mind
some kind of objective criterion. Here we note that a traditional objective
for central banks is to maintain price stability and output at its natural
level. In the case of the Federal Reserve, this is objective is known as the
dual mandate. Because the new vintage of models evolve from individual
optimization, it is possible in principle to derive a welfare criteria for the
central bank explicitly by taking a quadratic approximation of the utility
function of the representative household. For example, in a slightly simpler
version of our model, one can derive something akin to a dual mandate
endogenously. That is, it is possible in this instance to derive a loss function
for the central bank that is quadratic in deviations of in￿ ation from zero
and deviations of output from the socially e¢ cient (competitive equilibrium)
level.10
Here we simply presume, as in practice, that the central bank has in mind
10See, e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
21a dual objective in terms of stabilizing in￿ ation and the output gap, without
being overly precise about the exact form. We presume further that the nat-
ural level of output is su¢ ciently close to the socially e¢ cient value, so that
the welfare-relevant gap is simply the deviation of output from its natural
level. With this rough criteria in mind, we subject the model economy to
several kinds of disturbances and then evaluate the performance of alterna-
tive monetary policy strategies. These experiments are representative of the
policy evaluation exercises that central banks can do in practice.
We present two numerical simulations of the model. The ￿rst illustrates
how there may be gains to a central bank from managing expectations of the
future course of monetary policy. These gains take the form of improving
the short run tradeo⁄ between in￿ ation and output. The second experiment
demonstrates the importance to the central bank of accounting for move-
ments in the economy￿ s natural (i.e., ￿ exible price) equilibrium in making its
policy decisions.
In order to perform the simulations, we need to choose numerical values
for the various model parameters. The appendix for the on-line version of
this paper lists all the model parameters along with the values used for
the simulations. By and large, the values we use are conventional in the
literature. We now turn to the model experiments.
Experiment 1: Managing expectations. Here we illustrate how a
central bank￿ s ability to credibly signal its future policy intentions in￿ uences
its ability to maintain price and output gap stability. We suppose that a
central bank intends to pursue an interest policy that aggressively ￿ghts in-
￿ ation. We then consider two di⁄erent scenarios: In the ￿rst, the central
22bank is able to successfully signal its intentions to the private sector. In the
second, the private sector believes that the central bank is likely to accom-
modate in￿ ation.
We assume that the economy is hit by ￿cost push￿pressures in the form
of a persistent increase in ut (see equation 2). An example of this kind
of scenario might be a situation where workers resist moderating real wage
growth for a period of time in the wake of a decline in trend productivity
growth In this situation, unit labor costs and hence ￿rms￿marginal costs rise,
which in turn creates in￿ ationary pressures, as implied by equation (2). We
assume that the cost push shock obeys a ￿rst order autoregressive process,
with an autocorrelation of 0:95. This choice permits our model to capture
the high degree of autocorrelation of in￿ ation in the data.
The aggressive policy that the central bank plans to pursue is an interest
rate rule that responds only to in￿ ation and not the output gap. The coef-
￿cient on in￿ ation ￿￿ is 1:5, implying that the central bank raises nominal
rates a hundred and ￿fty basis points, for every hundred basis point rise in
in￿ ation. In the ￿rst case the private sector accepts that the central bank will
follow this rule inde￿nitely into the future. In the second case the private
sector believes instead the central bank will instead pursue a passive rule
that does not try to curb in￿ ationary pressures. The accommodative rule
that the private sector perceives the central bank will follow in the future
has a feedback coe¢ cient on in￿ ation of 1:0;implying only a one-for-one re-
sponse of nominal rates to in￿ ation. 11 In this spirit, the private sector views
any departures of the current short term interest from this rule as purely
11Strictly speaking we assume ￿￿ = 1:001, in order to guarantee the existence of a
unique stationary equilibrium.
23transitory.
We assume further that in the case where it is not credible, the central
bank nonetheless tries to curtail in￿ ation by raising the nominal interest rate
su¢ ciently to contract aggregate demand by the same amount each period
as if it was pursuing a perfectly credible aggressive policy with ￿￿ = 1:5. In
particular, each period the central bank raises the nominal rate as needed
in order to contract output by the same amount that would occur under a
credible aggressive policy. The problem it faces, however, is that the market
is expecting the accommodative policy. As a result, to engineer the same
output contraction that would arise under a credible aggressive policy, the
central bank needs to increase sharply the current nominal interest rate:
Because the private sector expects reversion to the accommodating policy in
the future, to contract demand su¢ ciently the central bank must compensate
with an extra large increase in the current short term rate. Put di⁄erently,
under the credible aggressive policy, the central bank exploits its ability to
in￿ uence expectations over the entire yield curve. It contracts demand today
not only by raising short term rate today but also by creating expectations
that future short rates will be su¢ ciently high as well (inducing expectations
of a lower output gap in the future). Without the leverage over market
expectations, the central bank is left with the current short rate as the only
way to in￿ uence current demand.
Table 1 shows the responses of in￿ ation and the output gap that the model
economy generates for the ￿rst two years after the costs push shock. It does
so for both the case where the central bank is credible and for the case it is
not. Period 0 is the time of the shock. In each case we report the change in
24in￿ ation and output one and two years after the shock. Under each scenario
the central bank raises interest rates to counteract the in￿ ationary pressures.
Given how we designed the experiment, the decline in output is the same in
each case.12 However, the rise in in￿ ation is much larger in the case where
the central bank is perceived to be accommodative as opposed to credibly
aggressive. This occurs because in￿ ation depends on expectations of future
demand conditions, in addition to current conditions. What this experiment
illustrates is that being able to e⁄ectively manage expectations improves the
short run tradeo⁄between output and in￿ ation stabilization that the central
bank faces. Market perceptions of accommodation yield higher in￿ ation for
a given current contraction of economic activity. It follows that to gener-
ate a given slowdown of in￿ ation, these perceptions of accommodation force
the central bank to engineer a larger contraction in output than it would
otherwise be necessary.
This experiment may also provide insight to how monetary policy di⁄ers
today from the period of the Great In￿ ation in the 1970s. Whenever the
Federal Reserve attempted to reign in in￿ ation during this earlier period,
the e⁄ort either had little success or proved costly in terms of output loss.
In recent times the reverse seems true. In our view, the explanation for
the di⁄erence is that in the current era the Federal Reserve has established
a credible long term commitment to maintain price stability, which was not
the case in the earlier period. This also helps explain why the current Federal
Reserve places so much emphasis on communicating its future intentions.
Experiment 2: Tracking the natural equilibrium. We next suppose
12Since the cost push shock does not a⁄ect the natural level of output, the response of
the output gap is the same as the response of output in this case.
25that the economy is hit with a shock to productivity. In contrast to the
previous experiment, the disturbance in￿ uences the natural values of output
and the real interest rate. Thus we now distinguish between movements in
the output gap versus movements in output. Our goal here is to illustrate
why it is important for the central bank in setting interest rates to account
for the movement in the economy￿ s natural equilibrium.
In particular, we assume that technology growth obeys an AR(1) with
autoregressive coe¢ cient equal to 0:5: We then determine the response of
the model economy to an unanticipated increase in technology growth under
two di⁄erent policy scenarios. Under the ￿rst, the central bank adjust the
nominal interest rate in response to movements in both the natural rate of
interest and in￿ ation, exactly as the policy rule (3) suggests. In the second
case the central bank pays no attention to movements in the natural rate of
interest, and responds simply to in￿ ation. In each case we set the feedback
coe¢ cient on in￿ ation ￿￿ = 1:5, which corresponds to the aggressive case
studied above.
Table 2 reports the responses of in￿ ation and output. The rise in pro-
ductivity growth induces an increase the natural rate of interest.13 Observe
that under the policy rule that adjust for movements in the natural rate,
in￿ ation remains stabilized. In this instance the response of output mirrors
the response of the natural level of output. Put di⁄erently, even though the
13Speci￿cally, up to a ￿rst order, the natural rate of interest is equal to the expected
growth of consumption under the ￿ exible price equilibrium times the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion. This relation comes from the consumption euler equation that applies in the
￿ exible price equilibrium and assumes perfect capital markets, etc. The rise in the natural
rate of interest thus re￿ ects the facts that the shock to productivity growth produces an
expected increase in consumption growth in the ￿ exible price equilibrium.
26productivity shock generates a rise in output, the gap between output and its
natural value remains at zero. Because the output gap doesn￿ t move, neither
in￿ ationary or de￿ ationary pressures emerge.
By contrast, if the central bank fails to account for movements in the
natural rate, it does not increase the nominal rates su¢ ciently to curtail
in￿ ation. Because the real rate is below the natural rate for at least a year
under this scenario, excess demand emerges. Output increases relative to
the natural level of output. For a period, the output gap is positive and,
accordingly, in￿ ation rises above trend. This is reversed after a year. In￿ ation
falls slightly below trend. The reason is that the natural rate eventually falls
below trend for a persistent period due to extra capital accumulation from
above trend investment. By failing to compensate, the central bank keeps
the real rate a bit too high relative to the natural rate.
In reality, of course, the central bank cannot directly observe the natural
rate of interest. However, as economic conditions change, the central bank
has to draw inferences about the likely consequences for the natural rate.
Indeed, a number of central banks including the Federal Reserve, are using
models of the type we have been discussing to try to identify the natural
rate. Of course, indirect methods are also used. In particular, the behavior
of in￿ ation tells the central bank something about the underlying natural
rate. In￿ ation above what it might expect may in principle be a sign that
the natural rate is higher than it was perceived, and vice-versa.
273 Extensions and New Directions
Our baseline model, while useful for pedagogical purposes, is too parsimo-
nious to be taken to the data or to be used in actual policy simulations. It
is thus not surprising that much recent work, largely conducted by research
teams based in central banks or international institutions, has aimed at mak-
ing the model more realistic, by adding a variety of features that are likely
to enhance its ￿t of the data.14 We now describe some of those features and
then brie￿ y discuss some extensions that are in progress.
Taking the Model to Data: The macroeconomic variables within the
baseline model appear to display greater persistence in practice than this sim-
ple framework can capture. For example, the evidence suggests that a tran-
sitory exogenous shift in monetary policy produces a delayed hump-shaped
response of the key quantity variables, output, consumption and investment.
The baseline model instead predicts an instantaneous jump in these variables,
followed by a monotonic response to trend. The reason for this is the ab-
sence of frictions that may slow down the adjustment in either consumption
or investment to either current shocks, news about the future, or both.
A common way to address this issue is to introduce adjustment costs.
In the case of consumption, a typical approach is to assume the presence of
habits in agents￿preferences, by making current utility a function of the de-
viation of current consumption from a benchmark usually set to be a (large)
14Early examples of models embedding some of the features discussed here were Smets
and Wouters (2003) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). Some of the recent
medium-scale models developed by policy institutions, built on those early examples, in-
clude the New Area Wide Model developed at the ECB (see, e.g., Coenen, McAdam and
Straub (2006)) , the SIGMA model of the Board of Governors (Erceg, Guerrerri and Gust
(2006)), and the GM model developed by the IMF (Bayoumi (2004)).
28fraction of lagged consumption. Similarly, in order to make the model con-
sistent with the sluggish response of investment to shocks, it is sometimes
assumed that adjustment costs arise as a result of changes in the level of
investment, as opposed to the level of investment itself (relative to the capi-
tal stock) as found in the standard Tobin￿ s q model.15 The slow adjustment
of both consumption and investment behavior, in turn, gives rise to hump-
shaped dynamics of output, as is consistent with the evidence.
A further modi￿cation considered important for the empirical perfor-
mance of the model is the introduction of wage rigidity. In our baseline
model we treated as exogenous the cost push shock and emphasized how
variation in this shock creates variation in in￿ ationary pressures. The quan-
titative models endogenize movements in the cost push shock by introducing
sticky nominal wages. A popular approach, due to Erceg, Henderson, and
Levin (2000), is to introduce staggered nominal wage contracting using the
same kind of Calvo/Poisson adjustment process that is used to model stag-
gered price setting. In this environment, the cost push shock in the Phillips
curve is no longer exogenous, but instead respond endogenously to any shock
that a⁄ects the gap between wages and their natural equilibrium values.
New Directions: We now brie￿ y mention several new areas of active
research that we ￿nd particularly interesting:
1. State-dependent pricing: While the models discussed above are optimization-
based, there is one key aspect in which they are still a black box, namely the
timing of price-adjustment. As we have discussed, for reasons of tractabil-
ity, the models restrict attention to time-dependent pricing rules where the
15It can be shown that planning lags in investment expenditure can motivate this kind
of formulation.
29frequency of price adjustment is ￿xed. Recently, there has been an e⁄ort
to develop models based on state-dependent pricing. where ￿rms face ￿xed
costs of price adjustment and the adjustment frequency is determined en-
dogenously. Examples include Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), Golosov
and Lucas, (2006), Midrigan (2006) and Gertler and Leahy (2006).
2. Labor market frictions. In existing models all ￿ uctuations in em-
ployment are along the intensive margin, i.e., all the variation is in hours per
worker. There is no unemployment, per se. The models thus cannot account
for the observed ￿ uctuations in unemployment and job ￿ ows,. A recent and
rapidly growing literature seeks to overcome this shortcoming by developing
versions of the new Keynesian model that incorporates the kind of labor mar-
ket frictions found in the search and matching literature. Examples include
Walsh (2003), Trigari (2006), Blanchard and Gali (2006), and Gertler, Sala
and Trigari (2007).
3. Financial market imperfections. As we have noted earlier, the base-
line model assumes that capital markets are perfect. In many instances, this
approximation may be reasonable. However, there are certainly many situa-
tions where ￿nancial market frictions are highly relevant considerations. In
this regard, there is an on-going e⁄ort to incorporate ￿nancial factors within
the kind of quantitative macroeconomic framework we have been discussing,
with the aim of better understanding the appropriate role of monetary pol-
icy in mitigating the e⁄ects of ￿nancial crises. Examples include Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2006), Mona-
celli (2006), and Iacoviello (2005).
304 Final Thoughts
We emphasize that the models we have described are still works in progress.
Despite the recent successes, we cannot be certain without further experience
how resilient these frameworks will prove as new kinds of disturbances hit
the economy. Indeed, we fully expect these models to continue to evolve as
we accumulate more data and experience more economic shocks. It may be
very well the case that important new features are introduced and that ones
that are central for performance today are less so in the future. At the same
time, while we expect the models to change we think the general approach
will not: Quantitative macroeconomic modeling along with its role in the
policy-making process is here to stay.
31APPENDIX: A Description of the Monetary Model
The operational model consists of a set of linear stochastic di⁄erence
equations. These equations are obtained by taking a log-linear approximation
of the equilibrium conditions of the original non-linear model, around the
deterministic steady state. That model is in turn a real business cycle model,
augmented with monopolistic competition and nominal price rigidities.
At a very general level, there are two key di⁄erences from a traditional
Keynesian framework. First, all the coe¢ cients of the dynamical system de-
scribing the equilibrium are explicit functions of the primitive parameters
of the model, i.e. they are explicitly derived from the underlying theory.
Second, expected future values of some variables enter the equilibrium con-
ditions, not only current and lagged ones. In other words, expectations
matter.
As with the traditional framework, it is convenient to organize the system
into three blocks: aggregate demand, aggregate supply, and policy. In this
appendix we describe each block, and its mathematical representation.
Aggregate Demand
The aggregate demand block consists of four equations. A central equa-
tion of that block is given by an aggregate goods market clearing condition,
i.e. a condition equating output to the sum of the components of aggregate
demand. In log-linear form we can write it as:
yt = ￿c ct + ￿i it + dt (AD1)
where y is output, c is consumption, i is investment, and dt captures the com-
bined e⁄ect of other demand components (including government purchases
32and external demand). For simplicity we take those components as exoge-
nous. The four variables are expressed in log deviations from a steady state.
￿c and ￿i represent the steady state shares of consumption and investment
in output, respectively.
The other relations characterize the behavior of each endogenous compo-
nent of spending, i.e. consumption and investment. We describe the relation
for consumption ￿rst, and then turn to investment.
In the baseline model, both capital and insurance markets are perfect.
A representative household makes consumption, saving and labor supply de-
cisions in this environment. Within this frictionless setting, the permanent
income hypothesis holds perfectly. An implication is that the household
strictly obeys a conventional Euler equation that relates the marginal cost of
saving (the foregone marginal utility of consumption) to the expected mar-
ginal bene￿t (the expected product of the ex-post real interest rate and the
discounted marginal utility of consumption next period). Log-linearizing this
equation yields a familiar positive relation between expected consumption
growth and the ex-ante real interest rate: Everything else equal, an expected
rise in real rates makes the return to saving more attractive, inducing house-
holds to reduce current consumption relative to expected future consumption.
By rearranging this relation, we obtain the following di⁄erence equation for
current consumption demand
ct = ￿ (rt ￿ Et￿t+1) + Etct+1 + "c;t (AD2)
where rt is the nominal interest rate, ￿t+1 denotes the rate of price in￿ ation
between t and t + 1 and "c;t is an exogenous preference shock. Et is the
33expectational operator conditional on information at time t. Note, in partic-
ular, that the previous equation implies that current consumption demand
depends negatively on the real interest rate and positively on expected future
consumption.
Investment is based on Tobin￿ s q theory. As in the conventional formu-
lation, due to convex costs of adjustment, investment varies exactly with Q,
the ratio of the shadow value of the marginal unit of installed capital to the
replacement value. Su¢ cient homogeneity is built in both the production
and adjustment cost technology to ensure that average and marginal q are
the same. Accordingly, by log-linearizing the ￿rst order conditions for invest-
ment, we obtain a simple linear relation between the investment-capital ratio
and average q. Formally, aggregate investment, expressed as a ratio to the
capital stock kt, is a function of (log) Tobin￿ s q and an exogenous disturbance
"i;t.
it ￿ kt = ￿ qt + "i;t (AD3)
We close the aggregate demand sector with an equation describing the
evolution of q. Typically, the replacement price of capital is either ￿xed at
unity or given exogenously. Accordingly, the endogenous variation in q comes
from movement in its shadow value, which is in turn given by the discounted
stream of expected returns to capital. By log-linearizing this relation, one
obtains an expression that relates q to the expected path of earnings net the
expected path of short term real interest rates. Formally,
qt = (1￿￿(1￿￿)) Et(yt+1￿kt+1￿￿p;t+1)￿(rt￿Et￿t+1)+￿ Etqt+1 (AD4)
34where ￿p denotes the (log) price markup. Thus, we see that q depends
positively on the expected returns to investment, which in equilibrium is
given by the expected marginal product of capital adjusted by the markup
(or, equivalently, the equilibrium rental cost) Et(yt+1 ￿ kt+1 ￿ ￿p;t+1); and
negatively on its opportunity cost, given by the expected real interest rate,
rt ￿ Et￿t+1.
Aggregate Supply
There are six equations in the aggregate supply block. We begin with
production. There is a single ￿nal good, which is produced under perfect
competition using a simple CES aggregator of intermediate goods. The only
signi￿cant role of the ￿nal goods sector (other than transforming all inter-
mediate goods into a single ￿nal good) is to generate a downward sloping
demand for each intermediate good.
Each ￿rm in the intermediate goods sector is a monopolistic competi-
tor producing a di⁄erentiated good, which it sells to the ￿nal goods sector.
Production of each intermediate good is carried out with a Cobb-Douglas
technology that uses capital and labor. Formally, we have
yt = at + ￿ kt + (1 ￿ ￿) nt (AS1)
where kt and nt respectively denote (log) capital and (log) hours, and at
represents the (log) of total factor productivity. As in real business cycle
models, total factor productivity is assumed to ￿ uctuate over time according
to an exogenous process.
Each intermediate goods ￿rm sets the price for its good given the demand
curve for its product and taking as given the wage, the rental cost of capital,
35and all other aggregate variables. Critically, ￿rms do not get to readjust the
price every period. Instead, they set prices on a staggered basis. For simplic-
ity, it is often assumed that ￿rms use "time-dependent" pricing strategies,
where they set prices optimally over an exogenously given horizon. Beyond
the signi￿cant gain in tractability, the main justi￿cation for treating the ad-
justment frequency as exogenous is that the evidence suggests that the price
adjustment frequencies are reasonably stable in low in￿ ation economies.16
Of course, this means that the models are mainly relevant for these kinds of
environments and are certainly not appropriate for analyzing high in￿ ation
economies. At the same time, work is under way to relax the assumption of
time-dependent pricing policies and instead introduce state-dependent poli-
cies where the frequency of adjustment is determined endogenously.
At any point in time, accordingly, a fraction of ￿rms adjust price and the
remaining fraction keep their prices ￿xed. At any time t, ￿rms that are not
setting a new price simply adjust output to meet demand, so long as the
markup of price over marginal cost remains positive. Given that marginal
cost varies positively with shifts in aggregate demand, booms that move
output above the natural level cause price markups to decline for ￿rms that
do not adjust price, and vice-versa for contractions that move output below
the natural level. Thus, what ultimately makes cyclical departures of output
from its natural level possible are countercyclical movements in markups
stemming from price stickiness.17
16See, e.g. Klenow and Krystov (2005)
17Because intermediate goods ￿rms are monopolistic competitors, they have a positive
desired markup; i.e. if they were free to set price each period, they would always choose
a positive markup. Thus, in the ￿ exible price equilibrium, output is below the socially
e¢ cient level. With sticky prices, booms push output toward the e¢ cient level and vice-
36Firms that are adjusting choose their respective prices optimally, given
the constraint on the frequency of price adjustment. It is typically assumed
that the adjustment frequencies obey a simple model originally proposed by
Calvo (1983). Each period, a ￿rm is able to adjust its price with probability
1￿￿. The realization of this draw is independent across ￿rms and over time.
This setup captures staggered price setting in the simplest possible way: Each
period only the fraction 1￿￿ of ￿rms are adjusting their price. The average
amount of time a ￿rm keeps its price ￿xed is given by 1=(1 ￿ ￿), where the
parameter ￿ is thus a measure of the degree of price rigidity. Note that ￿
may be ￿xed to match the micro-evidence on price adjustment frequencies.
An important virtue of this approach is that because the adjustment
probability is independent of the ￿rm￿ s history it is not necessary to keep
track of di⁄erent vintages of ￿rms, which greatly simpli￿es aggregation. In
this instance, to a ￿rst approximation the log price level evolves as a weighted
average of the log price set by those ￿rms that adjust and the log of the
average price for the ￿rms that do not adjust. The weight on the former
being simply the fraction that adjusts, 1 ￿ ￿, while the weight on the latter
is ￿. Formally, we have




t is the price set by ￿rms adjusting their price in the current period.18
It is straightforward to show that, to a ￿rst approximation, adjusting
￿rms choose a price equal to a constant markup over a weighted average of
versa for contractions. It is assummed that the boom is never large enough to push output
beyond the socially e¢ cient level (i.e. the economy always operates in a region where price
exceeds marginal cost).
18Note that because the fraction that does not adjust is a random draw, the average
price of this population is simply last period￿ s economy-wide average price.
37current and future expected nominal marginal costs. Formally, this can be
represented by the di⁄erence equations
p
￿
t = (1 ￿ ￿￿) [wt ￿ (yt ￿ nt)] + ￿￿ Etp
￿
t+1 (AS3)
where wt denotes the (log) nominal wage, and wt ￿ (yt ￿ nt) is the (log)
nominal marginal cost.19 Notice that, when solved forward, equation (AS3)
implies that ￿rms choose a price to be equal to a discounted sum of current
and expected future nominal marginal costs. In that discounted sum, the
weight on nominal marginal cost corresponding to any future period depends
on the discounted probability that the ￿rm will still have its price ￿xed at
that time. In the limiting case of complete price ￿ exibility (i.e. period by
period adjustment), the ￿rm simply sets price as a constant markup over
current nominal marginal cost.
The average price markup is given, in logs, by
￿p;t = pt ￿ (wt ￿ (yt ￿ nt)) (AS4)
As we noted earlier, the countercyclical markup behavior (along with pro-
cyclical real marginal cost) emerges because nominal prices are sticky. Many
quantitative versions of these models also introduce nominal wage stickiness.
This feature is not only consistent with the evidence: Including it tends to
improve the overall empirical performance of the model. A common way to
add wage rigidity is to assume that there exist monopolistically competitive
workers who set nominal wages on a staggered multi-period basis, in close
19Observe that since the production technology is Cobb-Douglas, nominal marginal
costs correspond to nominal unit labor costs, i.e., nominal wages normalized by labor
productivity.
38analogy to the way ￿rms set prices. In this context one can de￿ne a ￿wage
markup" as the wedge between the real wage and the household￿ s marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. This relation can be
expressed in log-linear form as follows:
￿w;t = (wt ￿ pt) ￿ mrst (AS5)
= (wt ￿ pt) ￿ (’ nt + ￿ ct)
In the frictionless competitive equilibrium this ratio is unity (making the
log of this ratio zero in this case). If worker￿ s have some markup power, then
it exceeds unity. With nominal wage rigidity, the wage markup will move
countercyclically, similar to the way nominal price rigidities help generate
countercyclical price markups. For expositional convenience here, we simply
take the wage markup as exogenous, but keeping in mind that this is a stand
in for a more explicit formulation.
Finally, there is a relation for the evolution of the capital goods. Next
period￿ s capital depends on the creation of new capital goods and what￿ s left
of the current capital after depreciation. This is formalized by means of the
capital accumulation equation
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿) kt + ￿ it (AS6)
As we noted earlier, the creation of new capital involves convex adjust-
ment cost, given rise to a variable shadow value of installed capital.
Equilibrium
39We let variables with a " e " denote deviations from their natural values,
where the latter are de￿ned as their equilibrium values in the absence of
nominal rigidities. We denote natural variables with an "n" superscript.
Thus, e xt ￿ xt ￿ xn
t . Furthermore, we assume for simplicity that percent
variations in the capital stock are small, which we approximate by setting
kt = 0 for all t.
We can thus rewrite (AD2), (AD4), and in terms of gaps as:
e ct = ￿￿ (rt ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ rr
n
t ) + Ete ct+1
e it = ￿ e qt
Combined with (AD1) they imply:
e yt = ￿￿c e rr
l







(rt+i ￿ ￿t+1+i ￿ rr
n
t+i)
Note that (AD3) can be rewritten as
e qt = (1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) Et(e yt+1 ￿ ￿p;t+1) ￿ (rt ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ rr
n
t ) + ￿ Ete qt+1
Iterating forward, e qt may be expressed as









where e zt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) (e yt ￿ ￿p;t). Thus holding constant current and
expected future interest rates, the rent to capital and hence Tobin￿ s q are
40procyclical. Conversely, holding constant the current and expected future
rents to capital, e qt moves inversely with current and expected future move-
ments in the interest rate.
We note that equation (??) also makes clear why most central banks are
reluctant to adjust interest rates to target asset prices (see, e.g., Bernanke
and Gertler (2001)) First, there is no reason to believe that the central bank
is better able than the private sector to assess the fundamental determinants
of asset prices, given by the right hand side of this equation. Second, there is
a circularity problem: e qt is highly sensitive to the current and future path of
interest rates. Thus a central bank that mechanically adjusts interest rates to
stabilize asset prices may wind up introducing undesired volatility to either
interest rates or asset prices, or both.
Furthermore, combining (AS2), (AS3), and (AS4) we obtain the aggregate
supply equation:




















￿￿ e qt ￿ ￿w;t
We can thus rewrite the in￿ ation equation in terms of the output gap as
￿t = ￿ Et￿t+1 + ￿ e yt + ut (6)
41where ut ￿ ￿(￿w;t ￿
￿i







Finally, we can represent monetary policy by means of a rule of the form:
rt = (1 ￿ ￿)(rr
n
t + ￿￿￿t + ￿ye yt) + ￿rt￿1 (7)
Equations (5), (6), and (7) provide the canonical representation of the
equilibrium dynamics of the monetary model used in a variety of applications
in the literature.
For the simulations presented in the text, we used the following parameter
values: ￿ = 0:33; ￿ = 0:99; ￿ = 0:99; ￿ = 2:0; ’ = 1:0; ￿ = 0:75;￿c = 0:63;
￿i = 0:15;￿ = 0:5;￿￿ = 1:5;￿ = 0:80: In addition, we assumed that the
autocorrelation of the cost push shock was 0:95:
42References
Alvarez, Luis J. (2007): "What do micro price data tell us on the va-
lidity of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve?," Bank of Spain, unpublished
manuscript.
Ball, Laurence and David H. Romer (1990): ￿Real Rigidities and the
Nonneutrality of Money,￿Review of Economic Studies 57, 183-203.
Bayoumi, Tam(2004): ￿GEM: A New International Macroeconomic Model,￿
IMF Occasional Paper no. 239.
Bernanke, Ben, Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist (1999), "The Finan-
cial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework," Handbook of
Macroeconomics, John Taylor and Michael Woodford, editors.
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Jordi Gal￿ (2006): "A New Keynesian Model
with Unemployment," mimeo.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans (2005):
￿Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic E⁄ects of a Shock to Monetary Policy,"
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 113, no. 1, 1-45.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Roberto Motto and Massimo Rostagno (2006):
"Monetary Policy and Stock Market Boom-Bust Cycles," mimeo.
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gal￿, and Mark Gertler (1998): ￿Monetary Policy
Rules in Practice: Some International Evidence￿European Economic Review,
vol. 42, 1033-1067.
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gal￿, and Mark Gertler (1999): ￿The Science
of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective,￿Journal of Economic
Literature, vol. 37, 1661-1707.
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gal￿, and Mark Gertler (2000): ￿Monetary Policy
43Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory,￿Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 105, issue 1, 147-180.
Coenen, G￿nter, Peter McAdam, Roland Straub (2006): ￿Tax Reform
and Labour Market Performance in the Euro Area: A Simulation-Based
Analysis unsing the New Area-Wide Model,￿Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, forthcoming.
Cogley, Timothy, and Argia M. Sbordone (2005): "A Search for a Struc-
tural Phillips Curve," Federal Reserve Bank of New York, mimeo.
Dixit, Avinash, and Joseph Stiglitz (1977): "Monopolistic Competition
and Optimum Product Diversity," American Economic Review, 67, 297-308.
Dotsey, Michael, Robert G. King, and Alexander L. Wolman (1999):
￿State Dependent Pricing and the General Equilibrium Dynamics of Money
and Output,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. CXIV, issue 2, 655-690.
Erceg, Christopher J., Luca Guerrieri, Christopher Gust (2006): ￿SIGMA:
A New Open Economy Model for Policy Analysis,￿International Journal of
Central Banking, vol. 2 (1), 1-50.
Fischer, Stanley (1977): "Long Term Contracts, Rational Expectations,
and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, 85 (1),
191-205.
Fuhrer, Je⁄rey C., and George R. Moore (1995): ￿In￿ ation Persistence￿ ,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, No. 440, February, pp 127-159.
Gal￿, Jordi (2007): Monetary Policy, In￿ation, and the Business Cycle,
unpublished monograph.
Gal￿, Jordi and Mark Gertler (1999): ￿In￿ ation Dynamics: A Structural
Econometric Analysis,￿ Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 44, no. 2,
44195-222.
Gal￿, Jordi, Mark Gertler, David L￿pez-Salido (2005): ￿Robustness of the
Estimates of the Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve,￿Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, vol. 52, issue 6, 1107-1118.
Gal￿, Jordi and Pau Rabanal (2004): ￿Technology Shocks and Aggregate
Fluctuations: How Well Does the RBC Model Fit Postwar U.S. Data?,￿
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2004, 225-288.
Gertler, Mark and John Leahy (2006): ￿A Phillips Curve with an S-s
Foundation," mimeo.
Gertler, Mark, Luca Sala and Antonella Trigari; (2007) ￿An Estimated
Monetary DSGE Model with Unemployment and Staggered Nash Wage Bar-
gaining.
Golosov, Mikhail, and Robert E. Lucas Jr. (2007): "Menu Costs and
Phillips Curves," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 115 (2), 171-199.
Goodfriend, Marvin and Robert G. King (1997): "The New Neoclassical
Synthesis and the Role of Monetary Policy," NBER Macroeconomics Annual,
231-282.
Hall, Robert (2005): "Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage
Stickiness," American Economic Review vol. 95, no. 1, 50-64.
Iacoviello, Matteo (2006): "House Prices, Borrowing Constraints and
Monetary Policy in the Business Cycle," American Economic Review, 95,
3 739-764.
Klenow, Peter J., Oleksiy Kryvtsov (2005): "State-Dependent or Time-
Dependent Pricing: Does it Matter for Recent U.S. In￿ ation?" NBER WP#
11043.
45Lucas, Robert E. (1976): "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique,"
Carnegie-Rochester conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 1, 19-46.
Mankiw, N. Gregory and David Romer (1991): New Keynesian Eco-
nomics, MIT Press (Cambridge, MA).
Midrigan, Virgiliu (2006): "Menu costs, Multi-Product Firms, and Ag-
gregate Fluctuations," mimeo.
Monacelli, Tommaso (2006): "Optimal Monetary Policy with Collateral-
ized Household Debt and Borrowing Constraints," mimeo.
Nakamura, Emi and Jon Steinsson (2006): "Five Facts about Prices: A
Reevaluation of Menu Costs Models," Harvard University, mimeo.
Primiceri, Giorgio, Ernst Schaumberg and Andrea Tambalotti (2006):
"Intertemporal Disturbances," mimeo.
Rotemberg, Julio and Michael Woodford (1999): ￿Interest Rate Rules
in an Estimated Sticky Price Model,￿in J.B. Taylor ed., Monetary Policy
Rules, University of Chicago Press.
Sargent, Thomas (1981): "Interpreting Economic Time Series," Journal
of Political Economy, 99 (2), 213-248.
Sims, Christopher (1980): "Macroeconomics and Reality," Econometrica,
vol. 48, no. 1, 1-48.
Smets, Frank, and Raf Wouters (2003): ￿An Estimated Dynamic Stochas-
tic General Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area,￿Journal of the European
Economic Association, vol 1, no. 5, 1123-1175.
Smets, Frank, and Raf Wouters (2006): "Shocks and Frictions in US
Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach," mimeo.
Taylor, John B. (1979): "Estimation and Control of a Macroeconomic
46Model with Rational Expectations," Econometrica, 47 (5), 1267-1286.
Taylor, John B. (1980): "Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts,"
Journal of Political Economy, 88, 1-23.
Taylor, John B. (1993): ￿Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice,￿
Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 39, 195-214.
Taylor, John B. (1999): ￿An Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy
Rules,￿ in J.B. Taylor ed., Monetary Policy Rules, University of Chicago
Press.
Trigari, Antonella (2005): "Equilibrium Unemployment, Job Flows, and
In￿ ation Dynamics," ECB WP#304.
Walsh, Carl (2005): ￿Labor Market Search, Sticky Prices, and Interest
Rate Rules￿ , Review of Economic Dynamics, 8, 829-849
Woodford, Michael (2001): ￿The Taylor Rule and Optimal Monetary
Policy,￿American Economic Review vol. 91, no. 2, 232-237.
Woodford, Michael (2003): Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory
of Monetary Policy, Princeton University Press.(Princeton, New Jersey).
Woodford, Michael (2006): "How Important is Money in the Conduct of
Monetary Policy?," unpublished manuscript.
47Table 1
Responses of In￿ ation and Output to a Cost Push Shock:
Credible vs. Not Credible Central Bank
Credible Not Credible
Time after shock In￿ation Output In￿ation Output
Zero 0:20% ￿0:60% 5:20% ￿0:60%
One Year 0:15% ￿0:50% 4:40% ￿0:50%
Two Years 0:10% ￿0:40% 3:50% ￿0:40%
48Table 2
Responses of In￿ ation and Output to a Productivity Shock:
with and without adjustments for movements in the Natural
Interest Rate
With Adjustment Without Adjustment
Time After Shock In￿ation Output In￿ation Output
Zero 0:00% 0:60% 0:24% 1:05%
One Year 0:00% 1:20% ￿0:07% 1:25%
Two Years 0:00% 1:10% ￿0:10% 1:10%
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